Is the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, which came out of the 2015 Algiers Process, still relevant?

The Algers Accord signed in 2015 between the Malian government and two coalitions of armed groups is aimed at a new institutional structure for Mali and at the integration of ex-fighters either into the army or the administration, or at helping them to integrate socially and economically. The Accord has hardly been implemented because of strong mistrust between Bamako and the signatory movements, with both parties judging that the other is not sincere. The armed groups should have disappeared through disarmament and elections, but this did not take place. Four elements account for the failure of disarmament: infighting among signatory groups, protection against ISGS jihadists, protection against the risk of the resumption of conflict, and finally, the link made by the groups between disarmament and the implementation of structural reforms. In the long run, the risks of failing to implement the Accord are the division or even the resumption of the conflict. At this stage, armed groups already control the north of the country. Breaking the deadlock entails overcoming the initial uncertainties. Although Bamako is not able to rewrite some of the articles of the Accord that might call into question the unitary status of Mali, it may be possible to enact laws correcting the moot points, provided that the signatory groups accept it. Overcoming this impasse also requires that the former rebels, who belong to the Arab and Tuareg minority groups, agree to give up their weapons in favor of electoral rules.